RCRA IMMUNITY FROM NEPA: THE EPA HAS
EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF ITS AUTHORITY

In 1980 the Environmental Protection Agency enacted regulations

exempting all Resource Conservation and Recovery Act permits
from the Environmental Impact Statement provisions of the Na-

tional Environmental Policy Act. This Comment argues that the

Environmental Protection Agency, in enacting these regulations,

exceeded the scope of its authority under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
INTRODUCTION

The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) require preparation of a
statement assessing the environmental impact of all proposed government actions which could have a significant effect on the environment.' The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates the generation and disposal of solid waste.2 This generally
involves activity inherently likely to have a significant effect on the
environment. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the regulatory agency which administers RCRA, has promulgated regulations governing the permit requirements under that Act. Those regulations categorically exempt all RCRA permits from the NEPA EIS
provisions. 3
Nothing in RCRA's text provides exemptions, categorical or otherwise, from the NEPA provisions.4 Since most RCRA permits involve activity affecting the environment, it is unlikely that Congress
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-70 (1982 &
Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter NEPA]. The Environmental Impact Statement [hereinafter
EIS] provisions are found at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1982).
2. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87
(1982 & Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter RCRA].
3. 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(6) (1986).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87.
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intended the kind of across-the-board exemptions enacted by the
EPA. If Congress intended to provide categorical exemptions from
the NEPA provisions it could have easily stated so in the text of the
statute. An examination of other environmental statutes reveals that
where Congress has intended such exemptions it has expressly provided for them in the statutory language. 5
Regulatory agencies are empowered to enact appropriate regulations to execute and enforce the law, but they cannot disregard Congress' mandate. "[T]he regulations of an agency of the United
States must be issued within the powers conferred by Congress (citation omitted). If agency regulations go beyond what Congress has
authorized they are void."' The EPA's freedom to regulate is limited
by congressional intent as expressed in the enabling statutes.
This Comment challenges the EPA's action. First, it examines the
applicable administrative law and the legislative history and text of
both NEPA and RCRA to determine whether the EPA, in enacting
these regulations, exceeded the scope of its enabling statute. The
Comment then addresses the public policy considerations against
condoning such regulatory overreaching if the EPA indeed exceeded
RCRA's scope. It also discusses the constitutional implications of an
administrative agency regulation which categorically defeats congressional mandates. Finally, this Comment concludes that Congress, with its corrective powers, should clearly define the RCRA
permit requirements and abrogate the agency's regulations.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF

1969

Purpose of NEPA
NEPA was enacted in 1969 and became effective on January 1,
1970.1 Its statement of legislative purpose is very clear and in fact
encompasses about one-sixth the length of the Act. NEPA establishes a national policy to "encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environment," 8 to "promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment," 9 and to
"enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural re5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1371(C)(1)(2)(1982); 15 U.S.C. § 793 (C)(1)(2) (1982).
6. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255,
258 (9th Cir. 1964) (citing Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110, 118 (9th Cir. 1959) and
Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 410 (1917)).
7. NEPA was enacted in response to continuing pressure for the creation of a
national environmental policy and an agency that would provide an overview of conservation and environmental protection. Extensive congressional hearings had been held over a
period of years on various measures relating to national environmental policy. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS. S.

No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.

9.
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sources important to the Nation."'"

NEPA emphasizes congressional concern with "the profound impact of man's activities on the interrelations of all components of the

natural environment"" and provides a congressional mandate that,
to the fullest extent possible, "the policies, regulations and public

laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered in
accordance with the policies [of NEPA]."1 The Act's central provision is the EIS section, which requires federal agencies to prepare a
report assessing the impact of any federal action that could significantly affect the environment.' 3 The EIS provision was designed to
ensure that the government would be required to consider the environmental effects of all proposed actions. Thus, with NEPA's enactment, environmental protection became part of the statutory mandate of all federal agencies.
10. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) also provides:
[I]t is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy,
to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to
the end that the Nation may (I) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended
consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, whereever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amendities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
11.42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).

12. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). This section provides:

[A]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall -

(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on (i)the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
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Application of NEPA to Federal Agencies

The provisions of NEPA are underscored by an Executive Order 14
instructing all federal agencies to initiate measures to ensure that all
policies and programs are conducted in a manner consistent with
furthering national environmental goals. The Executive Order instructs agencies to review statutory authority and regulations and
eliminate any policies or procedures preventing full compliance with
the NEPA provisions. It specifically instructs agencies to make necessary preparations to comply with the Act's EIS requirement and
directs the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)Ia to issue
guidelines regulating the preparation of these statements.' 6 The Act
does not exclude any agencies from its requirements.' 7 CEQ regulations provide that all agencies of the federal government must comply with the NEPA regulations.18

In determining what constitutes "major action significantly affect14. Executive Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,247 (1970) provides:
By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and
in furtherance of the purpose and policy of the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 . . . it is ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. The Federal Government shall provide leadership in protecting and enhancing the quality of the Nation's environment to sustain and
enrich human life. Federal agencies shall initiate measures needed to direct
their policies, plans and programs so as to meet national environmental goals.
The Council on Environmental Quality, through the Chairman, shall advise
and assist the President in leading this national effort.
Section 2. Responsibilities of Federal agencies. Consonant with Title I of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, hereafter referred to as the
"Act," the heads of Federal agencies shall:
(a) Monitor, evaluate, and control on a continuing basis their agencies' activities so as to protect and enhance the quality of the environment. Such activities shall include those directed to controlling pollution and enhancing the environment and those designed to accomplish other program objectives which may
affect the quality of the environment. Agencies shall develop programs and
measures to protect and enhance environmental quality and shall assess progress in meeting the specific objectives of such activities. Heads of agencies
shall consult with appropriate Federal, State and local agencies in carrying out
their activities as they affect the quality of the environment;
(d) Review their agencies' statutory authority, administrative regulations,
policies, and procedures including those relating to loans, grants, contracts,
leases, licenses, or permits, in order to identify any deficiencies or inconsistencies therein which prohibit or limit full compliance with the purposes and provisions of the Act. ...
15. The Council on Environmental Quality [hereinafter CEQ] is the agency created under NEPA to oversee administration of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 4342.
16. Executive Order No. 11,514, 35 Fed. Reg. 4,247 § 3(h) (1970).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2). "[The Act applies to] . . . all agencies of the Federal
Government .... ." In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court stated that
"NEPA, first of all, makes environmental protection a part of the mandate of every
federal agency and department."
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1507.1 (1986).
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ing the environment" for purposes of deciding whether preparation
of an EIS is required in a particular case, agencies are advised that
individual projects are not to be considered in isolation. Rather, the
cumulative effect of multiple projects must be taken into consideration. The CEQ guidelines instruct that "in considering what constitutes major action significantly affecting the environment, agencies
should bear in mind that the effect of many federal decisions about a
project or complex of projects can be individually limited but cumulatively considerable.' 9 In Conservation Council of North Carolina
v. Costanzo, ° the court stated that issuance of a permit by a federal
agency does involve "federal action" within the NEPA provisions.2
Thus, issuance of RCRA permits falls within the NEPA definition of
federal action.
Given these broad guidelines, the NEPA process can be burdensome and time-consuming. The decision whether an EIS should be
prepared for a given project may itself take a year or two and may
involve preparation of a "small" impact statement to demonstrate
that a "large" one is not legally required.22 The process is extremely
expensive. 21 It is not surprising, therefore, that agencies may attempt
to circumvent these requirements.
One commentator has noted:
Clearly, NEPA has made agencies more conscious of environmental consequences of their activities. Whether it has had the effect of making agencies
care about damage to the environment, or whether it has merely made them
aware of another obstacle they must overcome before they can get on with
19. CEQ Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 38 Fed.
Reg. 20,551 (1973) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.6(a)). Grad explains:
[Tlhis may occur when an agency invests limited resources in small projects
which, over a period of time, may collectively involve major resources. So, too,
when a decision which involves a limited amount of resources but is a precedent for major action or may involve a decision in principle about a major
course of action in the future, the early action may be considered "major." The
same result may occur, too, when several government agencies individually
make decisions about partial aspects of a major action. In all of these instances, environmental impact statements should be prepared "if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant impact on the environment from the
federal action."
2 F. GRAD. TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 9-50 (1986).
20. 398 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.C. 1975). See also National Forest Preservation
Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1973).
21. 398 F. Supp. at 671.
22. 2 F. GRAD, supra note 19, at 9-287.
23. Id. "In the northwestern part of the United States, for example, an informal
survey . . . conducted by EPA's Region X produced an estimate that more than 300
man-years were being devoted to preparing and commenting on impact statements by
Federal, state and local agencies." Id. at n.13 (quoting COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 246 (1973)).
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their project is a different matter.2
THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF

1976

Purpose of RCRA and its Application to NEPA
RCRA2 5 was designed to confront the problem of generation and
disposal of solid waste. RCRA establishes what has been called a
"cradle to grave"26 regulatory program for the management of solid
and hazardous waste. Solid waste in the RCRA context refers to
garbage, sludge or any other discarded material, whether it is solid,
liquid, semi-solid or gaseous.17 Hazardous waste is any solid that can
kill or make a person ill, or that can present a health risk when not
properly managed."'
The legislative history of RCRA reflects Congress' concern for environmental effects of improper waste disposal."' RCRA's text does
not provide exemptions from the NEPA requirements; neither does
the legislative history indicate congressional intent to shortcut existing statutory environmental provisions. Rather, the legislative history clearly reveals the intent that RCRA function "in a coordinated
and effective way" with other environmental laws.30
A factor supporting the assertion that action under RCRA is "major activity significantly affecting the environment" is that RCRA
24.
25.

2 F. GRAD, supra note 19, at 9-288.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87.

26.

T. SCHOENBAUM.

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW

543 (1985). The House Re-

port stated: "The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 is a multifaceted
approach toward solving the problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded
materials generated each year, and the problems resulting from the anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of such waste." H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6239 [hereinafter House
Report].
27. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). Federal regulations define solid waste at 40 C.F.R. §
261.2 (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
29. House Report, supra note 26, at 6238-6354. The discussion states that the
most effective way to illustrate the dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal is to
cite actual instances of damage caused by current hazardous waste disposal practices.
Approximately 60 examples of such instances throughout the United States are listed. Id.
at 6255-61. "[M]ost important, [this Bill] is a needed step toward protecting the purity
of the land itself, and [the] health of our people and the vitality of our environment." Id.
at 6249.
30. House Report, supra note 26, at 6241. The Report stated:
The committee believes that the approach taken by this legislation eliminates
the last remaining loophole in environmental law, that of unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and hazardous wastes . . . .At present the federal government is spending billions of dollars to remove pollutants on the land
in an environmentally unsound manner. The existing methods of land disposal
often result in air pollution, subsurface leachate and surface run-off, which affect air and water quality. This legislation will eliminate this problem and permit the environmental laws to function in a coordinated and effective way.
Id.
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facilities generally handle fairly large volumes of waste. Facilities
generating only small amounts of waste are not subject to the

RCRA requirements. 31 The inevitable local opposition which occurs

in communities targeted as sites of hazardous waste facilities further

reinforces the claim that the32disposal of such waste poses an inherent
danger to the environment.

EPA Regulations Exempting RCRA from NEPA
Because the disposal of hazardous waste under RCRA appears to

involve a great likelihood of potential environmental damage, this activity should fall squarely within the NEPA designation of an "action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
Waste disposal should be subject to almost per se inclusion in the
NEPA EIS provisions. The language of both the text and legislative
history of RCRA support this argument. 33 Yet, in November 1980

the EPA promulgated regulations governing the permit requirements
under RCRA, which provide that "all RCRA . . .permits are not
subject to the environmental impact statement provisions . . . of the
National Environmental Policy Act . . .-.

These regulations directly conflict with 40 C.F.R. sections 6.1006.1007, which govern the EPA's application of the NEPA EIS provisions and include an entire subsection explicitly describing NEPA's
application to RCRA solid waste demonstration projects and im31. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (1986).
32. For an example of judicial acknowledgement of the nuisance posed by hazardous waste, see Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 86 I11.
2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824
(1981), in which the community brought a common law nuisance action to require the
removal of a hazardous waste landfill. The Illinois Supreme Court, affirming a decision
granting an injunction, stated:
[W]e think it is sufficiently clear that it is highly probable that the instant site
will constitute a public nuisance if, through either an explosive interaction, migration, subsidence, or the "bathtub effect," the highly toxic chemical wastes
deposited at the site escape and contaminate the air, water, or ground around
the site. That such an event will occur was positively attested to by several
expert witnesses.
Id. at 27, 426 N.E.2d at 837.
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87; House Report, supra note 26, at 6238-6354.
34. 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(6)(1986). These regulations also exempt from the NEPA
provisions all permits under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration program authorized by the Clean Air Act (PSD permits); permits issued under the Underground Injection Control program authorized by the Safe Drinking Water Act (UIC permits); and all
permits other than permits to new sources issued under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System authorized by the Clean Water Act (NPDES permits). This Comment does not attempt to assess the propriety of these regulations except as applied to
RCRA.
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proved solid waste disposal facilities. 35 Sections 6.100-6.1007 require
that the responsible official assure preparation of an EIS when any
of a number of enumerated conditions exist. The conditions listed are
and probably would require an EIS in the majority of
extensive
36
cases.

Categorical exclusions from the NEPA EIS provisions are approached with extreme caution. The CEQ regulations state that categorical exclusions are to be defined as a "category of actions which
do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
35. Procedures for Implementing the Requirements of the Council on Environmental Quality on the National Environmental Policy Act, 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.100-6.1007
(1986). Sections 6.801-6.802 provide:
Section 6.801 Applicability.
The requirements of this subpart apply to solid waste demonstration projects
for resource recovery systems and improved solid waste disposal facilities undertaken pursuant to section 8006 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976.
Section 6.802 Criteria for Preparing ElSs.
The responsible official shall assure that an EIS will be prepared when it is
determined that any of the conditions in § 6.108 exist.
36. Id. § 6.108. The criteria for initiating environmental impact statements are as
follows:
The responsible official shall assure that an EIS will be prepared and issued for
actions under Subparts E, G, H, and I when it is determined that any of the
following conditions exist:
(a) The Federal action may significantly affect the pattern and type of land use
(industrial, commercial, agricultural, recreational, residential) or growth and
distribution of the population;
(b) The effects resulting from any structure or facility constructed or operated
under the proposed action may conflict with local, regional or State land use
plans or policies;
(c) The proposed action may have significant adverse effects on wetlands, including direct and cumulative effects, or any major part of a structure or facility constructed or operated under the proposed action may be located in
wetlands;
(d) The proposed action may significantly affect a habitat indentified on the
Department of the Interior's or a State's threatened and endangered species
list, or a structure or facility constructed or operated under the proposed action
may be located in the habitat;
(e) Implementation of the proposed action or plan may directly cause or induce
changes that significantly:
(1) Displace population;
(2) Alter the character of existing residential areas;
(3) Adversely affect a floodplain; or
(4) Adversely affect significant amounts of important farmlands as defined in
requirements in § 6.302(c), or agricultural operations on this land.
(f) The proposed action may, directly, indirectly or cumulatively have significant adverse effect on parklands, preserves, other public lands or areas of recognized scenic, recreational, archaeological, or historic value; or
(g) The Federal action may directly or through induced development have a
significant adverse effect upon local ambient air quality, local ambient noise
levels, surface water or groundwater quality or quantity, water supply, fish,
shellfish, wildlife, and their natural habitats.
40 C.F.R. § 6.108 (1986).
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human environment, 37 and that agencies must have special procedures for such categorical exclusions. The regulations require that
any such procedures adopted under their provisions must provide for
"extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action
may have a significant environmental effect." 38 Section 6.107 of the
Code of Federal Regulations also discusses categorical exclusions,
and again such exemptions are confined narrowly to "[c]ategories of
actions which do not individually, cumulatively over time, or in conjunction with other Federal, State, local, or private actions have a
significant effect on the quality of the human environment." 39
EPA's Failure to Carry Out CongressionalIntent
The EPA RCRA exemption provisions certainly fail to follow the
CEQ guidelines. It would be unrealistic to characterize the entire
field of solid and hazardous waste disposal as a "category of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on
the human environment." Solid and hazardous waste disposal is not
the type of activity intended to be summarily dismissed in a categorical exclusion. It does not seem that categorical exclusions, in any
case, were intended to be applied to such a broad category of activity. Furthermore, the EPA exemption regulations establish no provisions for circumstances in which normally excluded action does have
a significant environmental impact.4
In enacting these regulations, the EPA has acted beyond the scope
of congressional intent. Indeed, evidence indicates that Congress has
become impatient with the EPA's failure to effectively implement
environment protection statutes - RCRA in particular. Although
RCRA was enacted in 1976, the EPA did not promulgate any regulations allowing the Act to be implemented until 1980. A set of rules
was not completed until mid-1982, six years after the statute's
enactment.41
Congress indicated its impatience with the EPA by refusing to
wait for the agency to promulgate implementing regulations before
the 1984 RCRA amendments took effect. Those amendments, in
many instances, were self-effectuating. The extensive detail and comprehensiveness of the amendments bear a closer resemblance to reg37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1986).

Id.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.
40 C.F.R.

§ 6.107 (1986).
§ 124.9(6) (1986).
§§ 260-71 (1986).
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ulation than legislation.

2

One commentator has observed:

One can conclude from the form and substance of [the 1984 RCRA]
Amendments only that Congress was unwilling to trust EPA with the traditional task of the regulatory executive agency - the interpretation and
specification of comparatively vague congressional intentions expressed in
statutes. Historically, Congress has left the nitty-gritty work of writing regulations to the technical expertise of its creature agencies; here Congress
declined to do that. There are a number of possible explanations for this
unusual departure. . . . The most obvious, and probably correct conclusion
is that between 1980 and 1983, Congress came to perceive EPA as an
agency unwilling or unable to fulfill its mandate of environmental protection. Almost every section of the RCRA Amendments might be read as
expressing a sense of frustration over the pace and scope of EPA action. For
these reasons Congress elected to act, in effect, as its own regulatory
agency.4

A more specific example of Congress' dissatisfaction with the EPA
concerned the agency's designation of small quantity generators
under RCRA. Under the original EPA regulations, any facility generating hazardous waste in quantities of less than 1,000 kilograms
per month was excluded from RCRA regulation." Although the
EPA estimated that these exclusions allowed only one percent of the
total hazardous waste to escape coverage, the Office of Technology
Assessment found that a much higher amount, up to ten percent of
hazardous waste, could be escaping proper control under the EPA
provisions.4 Congress, concluding that the 1,000 kilogram per
month limit set by the EPA allowed too great a volume of hazardous
waste to escape regulation, amended RCRA to lower the limit for
unregulated activity to 100 kilograms per month.4
EXAMINATION OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES

If Congress had intended to provide exemptions from the NEPA
provisions it easily could have stated so in RCRA's text. An examination of other environmental statutes reveals that where Congress
has intended large scale categorical exemptions it has expressly provided for them in the statutory language. The Clean Water Act
provides:
[N]o action of the Administrator taken pursuant to this chapter shall be
deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment within the meaning of [NEPA] . . . . Nothing in
42. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616,
98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See Mugdan & Adler,
1984 RCRA Amendments, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 215, 216 (1985).
43. Mugdan & Adler, supra note 42, at 215, 217 (footnote omitted).
44. 40 C.F.R. § 261.5 (amended 1984).
45. H. R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I, at 25-26 (1983).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(d) (Supp. III 1987). Congress' uncharacteristic refusal to
defer to administrative discretion reveals a lack of confidence in the EPA's ability to
properly carry out its duties. Ordinarily Congress would not be expected to intrude into
the activity of setting standards, which is essentially a regulatory function.
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[NEPA] shall be deemed to ... authorize any [Federal] agency to impose,
as a condition precedent to the issuance of any license or permit, any effluent limitation other than any such limitation established pursuant to this
chapter.4"
The Clean Air Act contains virtually identical language. 48 Such lan-

guage is notably absent from RCRA's text.

The obvious congressional intent to exempt the Clean Water Act
and Clean Air Act from NEPA provisions is also found in NEPA's

legislative history. In 1969, while S. 1075,"9 the bill that would be-

come NEPA, was before Congress, Senator Edmund Muskie, who
headed the subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, opposed any

effect the Act might have on the standards set by his committee.
Senator Henry Jackson assured Muskie that NEPA would not ad-

versely affect those standards. 50 This was not an indication of environmental policy, but a political compromise made in an attempt to
pass S.1075 in the House. 51
EPA's

RATIONALE FOR THE REGULATIONS

In enacting these regulations, the EPA relied on the assertion that

RCRA permit requirements are the functional equivalent of an
EIS. 52 In fact, RCRA requirements vary widely depending on the

type of project. 53 In many respects the requirements of the two stat-

utes do overlap, particularly in the necessity for public information
and involvement. However, even a superficial comparison of the two

statutes reveals a major flaw in the EPA's argument. One of the
central provisions of the EIS requirement is the mandate that all

applicants consider alternatives to the proposed action, 54 as well as

the environmental effects of each proposed alternative. 55 The NEPA

regulations implementing this section are considerably detailed and
47. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1371(C)(1), 1371(2)(B) (1982) (citation omitted).
48. "No action taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a major Federal
action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969." 15 U.S.C. § 793(C)(!) (1982) (citation omitted).
49. S. 1075, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. RECORD 3,698, 3,701-08 (1969).
50. Senator Jackson headed the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. See
Comment, Delegation of Environmental Impact Statement Preparation:A Critique of
NEPA's Enforcement, 13 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 79, 83 (1985) (citing F. ANDERSON.
NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
ACT

5, 7-8 (1973)).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Comment, supra note 50; see also 115 CONG. REC. 40,425 (1969).
45 Fed. Reg. 33,173 (1980).
40 C.F.R. §§ 264, 270 (1986).
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii); 40 C.F.R. § 6.203(b)(1986).
40 C.F.R. § 6.203(c) (1986).
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even require that applicants consider the effects of a "no action"
alternative.56
The seven basic types of RCRA waste permits are tank storage,

container storage, surface impoundment, waste pile, land treatment,
landfill and incinerator facility permits. Other types of facilities are
being tested under the RCRA Research, Development, Demonstration and Information, (R,D&D) permit program. 57 An EIS would
require a determination of the environmental impact of the facility
proposed, of alternate types of facilities, and of the consequences of a
"no action" alternative. RCRA permit provisions require no consideration of alternatives whatever.58 The EIS cannot be considered the
functional equivalent of a regulation which lacks one of the EIS regulations' central provisions.
Perhaps the most troublesome of the RCRA provisions are the
R,D&D permit procedures. 59 While most RCRA permit requirements take one to two years to satisfy,60 R,D&D permits can be
obtained in four to eight months. The requirements for these permits
are much more lenient and many RCRA requirements can be modified or even waived at the EPA's discretion. 6 1 Experimental and unproven methods of waste disposal involve a degree of unpredictablity
which poses potentially the greatest danger to the environment. Yet,
these permits are subject to the most lenient requirements and their
potential danger is circumscribed by minimal safeguards.62
56. Id. § 6.203(b)(1).
57. Telephone interview with Kristen Anderson, EPA RCRA representative,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 28, 1987) (confirming that consideration of alternatives is not
part of the RCRA permit process). See also 40 C.F.R. §§ 264, 270 (1986).
58. Telephone interview with Kristen Anderson, supra note 57.
59. 40 C.F.R. § 270.65 (1986).
60. Telephone interview with Robin Neville, EPA RCRA representative, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 20, 1987).
61. Telephone interview with Nester Avilles, EPA coordinator of RCRA R,D&D
permit program, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 20, 1987). See also 40 C.F.R. § 270.65 (1986).
62. As of January 1987, experimental facilities were in operation under R,D&D
permits in Alexandria, Virginia (Atlantic Research Corp.); Monica, Pennsylvania (Saint
Joe Mineral Corp.); Gulfport, Mississippi (Naval Construction Battalion Center); and
Johnston, Texas (Johnston Atoll United States Air Force Facility). Telephone interview
with Nester Avilles, supra note 61.
On March 30, 1987 the EPA granted a fifth permit to G.A. Technologies to allow a
toxic waste incinerator to be built in La Jolla, California. This permit was granted despite broad public opposition as well as scientific evidence that the incinerator poses potential adverse environmental and public health dangers. The incinerator will be located
in a densely populated area directly across the street from the University of California,
San Diego, a campus of over 25,000 students, faculty and staff. Two hundred and fifteen
thousand people live and work within three miles of where the facility will be located and
three acute care hospitals are within two miles. The area, one of the most scenic in
California, also contains two very sensitive environmental preserves, one of which contains one of the last groves of Torrey Pine trees in the world. Yet the permit for this toxic
waste plant was granted, pursuant to EPA standards, with no consideration of the environmental threat posed. The plant will handle highly toxic materials containing cancercausing chemicals such as PCBs, dioxin, asbestos and arsenic. It may also handle organic
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That such a wide variance exists in the spectrum of RCRA permit

requirements reinforces the inappropriateness of the across-the-board

immunity from NEPA that the EPA would claim. Even if there

were individual instances where EIS exemption would be appropriate
(such as where investigation of alternatives had been independently

undertaken), this would properly be decided, as all other agency actions subject to NEPA are decided, on a case-by-case basis.
In enacting these regulations, the EPA relied heavily on ten lower
court decisions which it cites as supporting the assertion that the
agency itself should be exempt from NEPA. 3 Although the court in

each instance did exempt the EPA from the EIS provisions, seven of
the ten cases involved the Clean Air Act.64 In the remaining three

cases the courts had carefully established that functional equivalency
had been satisfied and alternatives considered in each instance. The
EPA's reliance on these cases is misplaced at best. 66 The agency's
solvents and mercury that can cause miscarriages, birth defects, and neurologic, kidney
and liver disease. The permit places no limitations on the types of waste that can be
incinerated. Air emissions will be required to be sampled once every test day but with no
requirement that sampling be done when burns are actually taking place. No plans have
been considered concerning a response in case of a disaster, such as an earthquake, fire,
explosion or other accident, resulting in the release of toxic material. Heifetz, Toxic
Waste For Torrey Pines?, San Diego Union, Apr. 24, 1987, at BI I, col. 1.
63. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,173 (1980).
64. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Essex Chem. Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir.
1973); Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Duquesne Light Co.
v. EPA, 481 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th
Cir. 1973). See also supra footnotes 47-51 and accompanying text. Portland Cement
Ass'n, on which the EPA relies as supporting its exemption, in fact, expressly refused to
make such a determination. The court stated: "[The EPA's] broad exemption claim...
should not be decided in the present case." The court noted that the "policies against a
NEPA exemption embrace the endemic question of 'Who shall police the police?' As
Senator Jackson stated 'It cannot be assumed that the EPA will always be the good
guy.'" 486 F.2d at 384. The court concluded: "[W]e add, finally, a word of clarification:
we establish a narrow exemption from NEPA [under the] Clean Air Act." Id. at 387
(emphasis added).
65. Maryland v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 116 (D. Md. 1976); Wyoming v. Hathaway,
525 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1975); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
66. The EPA, at 45 Fed. Reg. 33,173 (1980), cites Maryland v. Train, 415 F.
Supp. 116, 122-23 (D. Md. 1976): "Where federal regulatory action is circumscribed by
extensive procedures, including public participation, for evaluating the environmental issues and is taken by an agency with recognized environmental expertise, formal adherence to the NEPA requirements is not required unless Congress has specifically so directed." The EPA ignores the fact that this language was used in the context of a case
where the court found that alternatives had been extensively considered, and the "[functional] equivalence necessary to obviate the need for an [EIS]" had been satisfied. 415 F.
Supp. at 122-23. Outside of this context, the court's language is mere dicta.
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unfounded assertion that it can claim complete exemption from
NEPA, based on the narrow holdings of these lower court decisions,
is an unfortunate example of unrestrained agency overreaching.
NEPA, by statute as well as by Executive Order, expressly applies
to all agencies of the federal government. 67 Numerous federal regulations and cases describe NEPA's application to the EPA.6 8 Even
the Clean Water Act, which Congress has largely exempted from
NEPA by statute, is not entirely immune. All National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits to new sources issued by the EPA under the Clean Water Act expressly require an
EIS. 69
In declaring itself exempt from NEPA, the EPA implies that, because of its expertise in environmental protection, it can be trusted to
act in the best interest of the environment. Therefore, any statutory
measures ensuring this would be superfluous. It is ironic that the
central case the agency relies on in making this assertion7 0 is Maryland v. Train,7 1 in which the court reprimanded the EPA for granting a permit to dump sewage sludge in the Delaware Bay without
considering alternatives or holding a public hearing as required by
statute.7
Agency activity, by its very nature, is largely implemented
through the machinery of vast bureaucracies. The purpose of requiring that such operations be conducted within statutory confines is to
ensure uniformity of application and results. This is particularly important in the area of environmental protection. The agency's rationale for its claim of RCRA and EPA immunity from NEPA and the
"superagency" overtones it suggests are not persuasive.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY REGULATORY POWER

Since it is reasonable to conclude that Congress did not intend
that RCRA permits be categorically exempt from NEPA, it appears
that the EPA, in enacting these regulations, has exceeded the scope
67. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
68. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 6.801-6.802 (1986); 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(6) (1986). See also
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d
1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the court stated that "NEPA . . .makes environmental
protection a part of the mandate of every federal agency and department." 449 F.2d at
1112 (emphasis added).
69. 40 C.F.R. § 124.9(6) (1986). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (1982) (which
provides for exemption from NEPA "except for the provision of Federal financial assistance for

. . .

assisting the construction of publically owned works . .

.

and the issuance

of a permit. . . for the discharge of any pollutant by a new source") (emphasis added).
70. 45 Fed. Reg. 33,173 (1980).
71. 415 F. Supp. 116 (D. Md. 1976).
72. Id. at 122. "[T]here was no consideration given . . . either to possible alternatives on land or elsewhere in the ocean available . . . for sludge disposal . . . . [Tihe
administrator was without discretion to skip this essential step in the process."
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of its legitimate administrative power. The rule-making power of an
administrative agency is a delegated legislative power. As such, it
must be exercised within the limits of the power granted by the enabling statute. An administrative agency may not enact regulations
which are inconsistent with the statute it is administering. An
agency "may not, under the guise of a regulation, substitute its judgment for that of the legislature in administering a legislative act."73
The first step in determining the legitimacy of an administrative
action is to establish the applicable standard of review. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs the EPA's regulatory power.
The standard of review established by the APA is that an agency's
promulgated rule must be set aside if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the
law."7 4 "Arbitrary and capricious" may be defined as any action
which is unreasonable under the particular circumstances. "Abuse of
discretion" in judicial usage is the antithesis of reasonable action or
75
sound discretion.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis asserts that certain agency actions
are, in limited instances, immune from judicial review.7 6 However,
73. 73 CJ.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 89 (1983).
74. The scope of review provisions, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), read as follows:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an
agency action. The reviewing court shall (1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
75. Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965, 969
(1968-69).
76. 5 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 253-330 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter 5 K. DAvIs]. Professor Davis bases his unreviewability argument on the language of
5 U.S.C. 701 (a)(1) & (2), (concerning judicial review, which states: "This chapter ap-
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the prevalent view seems to be that there are few, if any, situations
in which absolute immunity would be appropriate. 7This is particularly true where arbitrary agency action is involved. 7 Raoul Berger,
who for years engaged in a public debate with Professor Davis on the
issue, states:
For more than 125 years before the passage of the APA the Supreme Court
declared again and again that there is no room for arbitrary action in our
system, that power to act arbitrarily is not delegated. Together with almost
spectrum of
all of the circuits it is stated without equivocation across a wide
8
administrative activity that arbitrary action is reviewable.

Even Professor Davis agrees that a strong presumption 9exists in
favor of the reviewability of administrative agency action.7
except to the extent that plies .
(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or
(2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."
Other discretion is reviewable. 5 K. DAVIS at 292. Moreover, Professor Davis asserts that
despite language in several Supreme Court holdings indicating a requirement of "clear
and convincing" legislative intent to cut off review, the "courts often hold, in the absence
of any indication of congressional intent, that action is unreviewable." K. DAvIs. ADMINIsTRATIV E LAW

59 (1977) (emphasis in original).

77. Professor Davis notes: "Action probably is never totally unreviewable, for the
most unreviewable action may usually be set aside for fraud, for complete absence of all
jurisdiction, or for clear unconstitutionality that deprives a challenger of a protected interest." 5 K. DAvIs, supra note 76, at 257. Davis challenges the notion that actions always are reviewable for arbitrariness, however, citing APA-based cases supporting his
position. 5 K. DAVIs, supra note 76, at 277-78 (citing Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line,
Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958); Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666 (1960); Arrow Transp. Co.
v. Southern Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 658 (1963)).
78. Berger, supra note 75, at 966. Mr. Berger notes sardonically that, in view of
the fact that the presumption for review "is buttressed by the clear Section 10(e) directive that courts 'shall . . set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,' it is a wondrous feat to emerge with 'agency immunity from review.'" Id. He goes on to argue:
Both "discretion" and "abuse of discretion" were terms of settled meaning at
the time the APA was drafted. Courts had long said that discretion "means
a discretion exercised not arbitrarily . . . ." An arbitrary finding "is
outside the administrative discretion conferred by the statute." ...
[D]iscretion simply "does not extend to arbitrary and unreasonable action."
Id. at 968-69.
79. Professor Davis writes: "[T]he Supreme Court for the first time explicitly established a presumption of reviewability in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136 (1967) . . . . The court said that 'judicial review of a final agency action . . . will
not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of
Congress . . . .' Early cases in which this type of review was entertained . . . have been
reinforced by the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, which embodies the
basic presumption of judicial review . . . . The words just quoted from the Abbott opinion are the law . . . . That [they] will continue to be the law seems unquestionable, for
the need for review of regulations is greater now than it was in 1967." 5 K. DAVIS, supra
note 76, at 255. The essence of Davis' view of the presumption of reviewability is this:
When significant private interests are at stake, the presumption of reviewability
controls unless it is rebutted by affirmative indication of legislative intent in
favor of unreviewability or by some special reason for unreviewability growing
out of the subject matter or the circumstances; the presumption is usually
given full effect.
5 K. DAVIS, supra note 76, at 254 (emphasis added).
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The Supreme Court, in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.

Volpe, 0 gave a narrow reading to the APA provision precluding judicial review where "agency action is committed to agency discretion

by law." The Court held that unreviewable administrative action occurs only where there is "no law to apply." ' According to one com-

mentator, this means for "all practical purposes that the issue is almost non-existent.

'8 2

The issue of the reviewability of agency

83
decisions under NEPA was addressed in McDowell v. Schlesinger.
The court in McDowell concluded that "[a]gency determinations
concerning the procedural requirements of NEPA are not committed
to agency discretion by law within the meaning of [APA] and are
therefore reviewable."' 4
The Supreme Court in Overton Park emphasized that courts must
be aggressive overseers when reviewing administrative actions which
affect the environment. The opinion states that courts reviewing
agency actions affecting the environment must engage in a "substantial inquiry" and a "thorough, probing, in depth review."5 This
"substantial inquiry" language has been called the Overton Park
"hard look doctrine. ' 86 Professor Davis points out that the "hard
It cannot convincingly be argued that the EPA's action was committed to agency discretion by law, since neither RCRA's text nor its legislative history indicate such a congressional intent or directive. Moreover, no special reason for unreviewability grows out
of the subject matter; the EPA harbors no congressional exemption from review. Thus,
Professor Davis would agree that the presumption of reviewability would govern review
of the EPA action at issue.
A recent Supreme Court case threatens to upset the presumption of reviewability.
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) held unreviewable an agency determination not
to enforce certain regulations. The Court stated that a general presumption of unreviewability of decisions not to enforce existed. 470 U.S. at 834. The Chaney decision
marks a reversal in the Court's approach to review of administrative action.
80. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
81. Id. at 410. Professor Davis argues that the entire "no law to apply" approach
is a misinterpretation of congressional intent. He argues that the presence or absence of
law to apply is irrelevant as to the reviewability of agency action. 5 K. DAVIS, supra note
76, at 290-91. While Davis' criticisms appear to have much merit analytically, his suggestions have not been followed in subsequent Supreme Court cases. See, e.g., Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
82. W. ROGERS. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 18 (1977).
83. 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975).
84. 404 F. Supp. at 241 (citing Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz,
498 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1974)).

85.

Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.

86. The "substantial inquiry" or hard look doctrine of Overton Park is a
tenet of modern administrative law and a catechism of environmental law. It
means that courts will accept nothing less than fairly conceived, fully explained,
and rationally based administrative discretionary judgments. Judge Harold
Leventhal, a respected analyst of the administrative process, says the courts
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look doctrine" can have two different meanings. It can mean that the
court is required to take a hard look at the agency actions, but it can
also mean that the agency is required to take a hard look at its
actions.8 7
The Overton Park opinion further states that a court should undertake a three-part review of agency action. First, the court must
determine whether the administrator "acted within the scope of his
authority."88 A reviewing court will show little deference for the
judgment of the administrator in this step of review, since such a
determination will be based on statutory construction, and the judiciary is the final arbiter on questions of law. Second, if the court finds
the administrator acted within the scope of his authority, the court
will determine whether the agency's decision was based on consideration of relevant factors and "whether there has been a clear error of
judgment." 89 Third, the reviewing court will determine whether the
agency followed the necessary procedural requirements."
The EPA regulations cannot withstand judicial scrutiny under
these standards. The creation of random categorical immunity exempting the entire spectrum of RCRA activity from the provisions
of a congressional mandate cannot reasonably be characterized as
anything but "arbitrary and capricious." Such broad-sweeping and
apparently careless provisions would seem to be a classic example of
an "abuse of discretion." If "arbitrary and capricious" is to be defined as action which is unreasonable under the circumstances, these
regulations may be characterized as the antithesis of reasonable action and sound discretion.
Neither would the regulations withstand scrutiny under the Overton Park "hard look" standard of review. The EPA has clearly failed
to take a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of RCRA
must take a hard look to assure that agencies (1) abide by fair and reasonable
procedures, (2) give good faith consideration to matters assigned to them, and
(3) produce results that are defensible in reason.
W. ROGERS, supra note 82, at 19 (citing Leventhal, Environmental Decision-Making
and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 511 (1974)).
87. 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 76, at 335.
88. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415-16.
89. Id. at 416. The APA instructs courts to use the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard if the case involves informal agency action and the "substantial evidence" standard if the case involves an agency decision made on the record after a hearing. 5 K.
DAVIS, supra note 76, at 335. Professor Davis asserts that, in fact, courts do not know
the difference between the "substantial evidence" scope of review and the "arbitrary and
capricious" scope of review. He says the two tests are sometimes the same and sometimes
different and whether they are the same or different is usually unpredictable. Id. at 357.
He indicates that, in any case, labels are superfluous because, regardless of what courts
call it, they proceed to undertake review ranging all the way from zero to 100%. K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 530 (3d Ed. 1972).
90. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 417. Here the court will show less deference to the
agency's decision if necessary procedural requirements were not followed.
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activity under the NEPA requirements. Moreover, it appears that
the agency neither "acted within the scope of its authority" nor
made a decision that was "reasonable under the circumstances."
Cases are numerous where administrative regulations have been
overturned because they conflict with a statute or exceed the scope
of administrative authority granted. In Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating

Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission,91 the court
examined an agency rule providing categorical exemptions from
NEPA EIS provisions. The Commission had promulgated regulations providing that no EIS was required if other agencies had already certified that their own environmental standards were satisfied
by the proposed action. The court, finding that one of the agencies
charged with administration of NEPA had "failed to live up to its
congressional mandate," declared the regulations invalid. "Our duty
. . . is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the

halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of
the federal bureaucracy."92
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. Herrington,93 the court
found that rules promulgated by the Department of Energy under
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act violated congressional intent. The court stated that "when an agency does not reasonably
accommodate the policies of a statute or reaches a decision that is
'not one that Congress would have sanctioned,' (citations omitted) a
reviewing court must intervene to enforce the policy decisions made
by Congress. 9 The court also noted that "an agency may not ignore the decisionmaking procedure Congress specifically mandated
because the agency thinks it can design a better procedure." 95 Further, the court found that the Department's decision not to prepare
an EIS was arbitrary and capricious. 96
In Motor Vehicle ManufacturersAssociation v. State Farm Mu-

tual Insurance Company,97 the court, finding agency regulations arbitrary and capricious and therefore void, held that an agency rule
would normally be found arbitrary and capricious if the agency had
"relied on factors which Congress ha[d] not intended it to consider
[or] entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the prob91.

449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

92. Id. at II11.
93.

94.
95.
96.
97.

768 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Id. at 1383.
Id. at 1396.
Id. at 1429-33.
463 U.S. 29 (1983).
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lem." s The court noted an absence of any apparent basis on which
the agency had exercised its discretion and concluded that the APA
would not permit it to accept such practice. "Expert discretion is the
lifeblood of the administrative process, but unless we make the requirements for administrative action strict and demanding, expertise, the strength of modern government, can become a monster
which rules with no practical limits on its discretion.' ""
The Regulations' Effect On Judicial Review Under RCRA

In light of the fact that most sources agree there are very few
situations in which agency action is absolutely unreviewable,100 one
of the most disturbing aspects of the EPA exemption regulations is
that they may effectively render any particular case immune from
judicial review on the issue of an EIS. Since any party failing to
prepare an EIS under a RCRA permit acts clearly within the scope
of agency regulations, no challenge on that issue is possible without a
successful attack on the regulation itself. The cost and time expense
imposed by this additional burden could effectively deter potential
challenges.
At least on the narrow issue of whether an EIS should be prepared
in a given instance, courts have agressively reviewed agency action
98. Id. at 43.
99. Id. at 48 (quoting New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951)).
See also Usery v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 557 F.2d 1113, 1118 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Administrative regulations are not absolute rules of law and should not be followed when
they conflict with the design of the statute or exceed the administrative authority
granted."). In United States v. Silva, 272 F. Supp. 46 (S.D. Cal. 1967), the court held
that Coast Guard-promulgated regulations constituted an unauthorized assumption of
power. "In determining whether a regulation promulgated by a federal agency is valid, it
must first be determined whether the regulation conforms with the statutory grant of
power extended the appropriate agency." 272 F. Supp. at 49.
In Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Anglo-Canadian Shipping Co., 335 F.2d 255 (9th
Cir. 1964), the court held that the Commission did not have statutory authority to promulgate the challenged regulations. "[T]he regulations of an agency of the United States
must be issued within the powers conferred by Congress [citation omitted]. If agency
regulations go beyond what Congress has authorized, they are void." 335 F.2d at 258.
See also Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110, 118 (9th Cir. 1959); Utah Power & Light
Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 410 (1917); Hawke v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue,
109 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1940).
In Porter v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 470 F. Supp. 203 (W.D. Tex. 1979), the
court held that defendant's reading of a federal regulation could not be sustained because
it would subvert the obvious intent of the statute. "It is well settled that '[t]he rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is 'the power to adopt regulations to
carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' [citation omitted].. .
In order to be valid, regulations must 'be consistent with the statute under which they
are promulgated.'" 470 F. Supp. at 206. See also Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. United
States, 664 F.2d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1981), in which the court used virtually identical
language in regard to an improper IRS interpretation of a federal regulation which was
inconsistent with the intent of the enabling statute.
100. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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on a case-by-case basis.101 Since the actual provisions of NEPA are
skeletal, the Act has been the focus of considerable litigation and
interpretation. 02 Judicial review has become extremely important
and the courts have played a substantial role in implementing
NEPA. The NEPA EIS provisions generated more cases than any
other environmental statute in the 1970s.10 3 This has resulted in the

101. Most NEPA cases involve challenges for failure to prepare an EIS in a particular situation rather than challenges against an agency's implementation of NEPA on
a large scale through rule-making. In 1976 the Council on Environmental Quality Report
on the first six years of NEPA noted that 654 cases had been filed, 363 of which asserted
that no EIS had been filed where required. The number of cases filed claiming NEPA
violations has remained steady in recent years. 2 F. GRAD, supra note 19, at 9-291.
See Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), which involved an action to
enforce compliance with NEPA with respect to the erection of a jail facility. The court
held that the function of a court in reviewing an agency determination whether agency
action requires an environmental impact statement "is to determine de novo 'all relevant
questions of law,' [citations omitted] and, with respect to [an agency's] factual determinations . . . to determin[e] whether [the agency's] findings are 'arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.'" 471 F.2d at 828.
McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975), involved an action
against the Department of Defense for failing to prepare an EIS in connection with a
plan to transfer an Air Force unit to a base in Illinois. The court found that the Department's conclusion that the relocation did not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of human environment or requiring preparation of an EIS
was unreasonable. The court stated: "NEPA's requirements are specifically designed to
counter the inevitable agency bias in favor of a proposal or project that it has recommended [citations omitted] and to effectuate substantive changes in the agency decision
making process." 404 F. Supp. at 241. The court further noted that "determination that
a proposed agency action would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment based upon clearly insufficient information would not only be an unreasonable decision, but would be arbitrary, capricious and constitute an abuse of discretion." 404 F.
Supp. at 250 (citing Hanley v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1972)).
In Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 389 F. Supp. 1171
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court granted an injunction halting construction by the United
States Postal Service of a vehicle maintenance facility, rejecting the Postal Service's contention that it was exempt from NEPA. "NEPA requires a careful and informed decisionmaking process and its procedural requirements must be strictly complied with." 389
F. Supp. at 1185.
In Conservation Council of N. Carolina v. Costanzo, 398 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.N.C.
1975), the court held that the Army Corps of Engineers, in undertaking to construct a
marina, was required to comply with the NEPA requirements. The court noted that it
was settled law that issuance of a permit by a federal agency involved "federal action"
for purposes of the impact statement requirement. 398 F. Supp. at 671. The court
pointed out that, in determining the impact of federal action on the environment, cumulative effects must be considered and "[s]econdary or indirect, as well as primary or
direct, consequences for the environment should be included in the analysis." 398 F.
Supp. at 672.
102. Weinstein, Substantive Review Under NEPA After Vermont Yankee IV, 36
SYRACUSE

103.

L. REV. 837, 838 (1983).

L. WENNER. THE ENVIRONMENTAL DECADE IN THE COURT 11 (1982).
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development of a "common law" of NEPA.10 4
Because of the important role judicial review has come to play in
implementing the NEPA EIS provisions, the EPA regulations' effect
of shielding any given case from review is particularly troublesome.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has stated that "NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing
judgment on the part of federal agencies."' 0 5 The Supreme Court,
deciding Baltimore Gas & Electric Company v. Natural Resources
Defense Council Inc., 08 concluded that the courts should perform
both a substantive and a procedural review under NEPA. °7 The
Court held that review on the merits under NEPA should be undertaken using the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 08
But, under RCRA regulations, even instances of arbitrary and capricious disregard of the environmental results of a particular action
can escape review. Allowing such a large category of agency activity
to be carved out and rendered immune from the careful case-by-case
review which has become the common law of NEPA will certainly
have serious consequences.
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE REGULATIONS

The effect of categorically shielding cases from judicial review
under the guise of regulations enacted by a public agency not subject
to political restraints also raises constitutional issues. Congress has
enacted a statute requiring an EIS for all government actions falling
within a particular category. 10 9 The Supreme Court has indicated
that substantive review should be undertaken under this statute to
assure its proper application. 10 An executive agency, operating
through unelected public employees, has promulgated regulations;
not pursuant to any apparent delegation of legislative authority, categorically defeating the mandates of both the legislative and judicial
branches of government. This violates the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers."'
104.
in part).
105.
106.
107.
108.

See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 421 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting
Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1123.
462 U.S. 87 (1983). See Weinstein, supra note 102, at 839.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 98. See Weinstein, supra note 102, at 839.

109. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
110. See Weinstein, supra note 102, at 839.
Ill. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring), Justice Jackson discussed the balance of power between the
executive and legislative branches and distinguished three separate categoties of activity.
343 U.S. at 635-38. This situation would appear to fall within Jackson's third category,
thus subject to the most careful scrutiny: When the executive branch "takes measures
incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, [its] power is at its lowest
ebb." 343 U.S. at 637. Such activity "must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
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One commentator recently noted that it was not until 1946 that
the APA provided a non-constitutional source of authority for the
courts to control administrative agencies" 2 and that "[tihere has
been a renewed emphasis on fundamental separation of powers analysis in examining the relationship of the agencies to the Constitutional branches."' 1 3 Since 1946, courts have, for the most part, relied
on the statutory provisions of the APA, rather than on constitutional
principles, in evaluating agency actions. However, it is important not
to lose sight of the underlying constitutional principles which restrict
administrative agency activity.
The Framers of the Constitution provided that all federal legislative action was to be undertaken by Congress subject to the bicameralism and presentment requirements carefully delineated in the text
of the Constitution.1 4 These explicit and unambiguous provisions are
integral parts of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The bicameralism provisions require that no law can take effect
without concurrence of the prescribed majority of members of both
Houses. The purpose of this requirement was to enforce the Framers'
belief that legislation should not be enacted until it had been carefully and fully considered by the country's elected officials. 11 5 Dividing Congress into two separate bodies was to ensure that lawmaking
power "would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and
debate in separate settings.""' 6 The purpose of the presentment
clauses and the presidential veto power was to ensure that the law-

stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system." 343 U.S. at 638.
112. BrufT, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV.
207, 209 (1984).
113. Id.at 211.
114. Article I provides:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a house of Representatives.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
2.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary ... shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be
approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds
of the Senate and House of Representatives ....
U.S. CONST.art. I, § 7, cl.
3.
115. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-49
(1983).

116. Id. at 951.
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making power of Congress would be "carefully circumscribed.""'
The framers employed these detailed balancing provisions to guarantee that laws enacted under the authority of the United States would
never be "oppressive, improvident or ill-considered."'

8

Goldsmith" 9

The court in United States v.
pointed out that administrative details could be left to agency discretion but that
"purely legislative powers of the federal government reside solely in
Congress under the Constitution and that [Congress] has no power
to renounce them in favor of any other branch of the government. '1 20 In Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 2 ' the court stated that
"[r]ulemaking is legislation on the administrative level . . .within

the confines . . . of the granting statute as required by the Constitution and its doctrines of non-delegability and separability of powers."' 2 In Devoe v. Atlanta Paper Company, 2 n the court held that
the delegation of power to the administrator was constitutional, but
that such power is constitutionally exercised only "where the definition is within the limits laid down by Congress. '"124
Administrative agency representatives are not monitored by the
political checks and restraints which influence congressional decisionmaking. Agency regulatory power must be exercised within the
confines of the power delegated by Congress. The safeguards carefully prescribed by the Framers would be rendered meaningless if
117. Id. at 947.
118. Id. at 947-48.
The choices . . .made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on
governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable,
but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a
form of government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked .... With all the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness and potential for
abuse, we have not yet found a better way to preserve freedom than by making
the exercise of power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in
the Constitution.
Id. at 959.
This discussion of separation of powers is, of course, merely a sketch. The doctrine is
complex, its tenets the object of dispute among the members of the Supreme Court itself.
See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. 3181, 3205, 3215 (1986). Justice White, in particular, has taken issue with the Court's "distressingly formalistic view of separation of
powers as a bar to the attainment of governmental objectives through the means chosen
by Congress and the President in the legislative processes established by the Constitution." 106 S. Ct. at 3205-06 (White, J., dissenting) (decrying the Court's decision to
invalidate portions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget process). In the
EPA's action at issue, however, the EPA, by violation of separation of powers, has barred
attainment of governmental objectives established by Congress, unlike the Bowsher case,
in which applicationof the separation of powers doctrine barred (according to Justice
White) attainment of congressional goals.
119. 91 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1937).
120. Id. at 985.
121. 174 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1949).
122. Id. at 693.
123. 40 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ga. 1941).
124. Id. at 286.
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unelected agency employees could casually promulgate rules defeating the clear intention of the federal legislature. When viewed in this
light, the EPA regulations at issue appear fatally flawed. Because
they were not promulgated within the confines of any apparent deleby Congress, they should be found
gation of power
1 25
unconstitutional.
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Aside from the possible constitutional issues, strong public policy
considerations oppose condoning this type of regulatory overreaching. If other agencies begin to follow suit in providing categorical
exemptions from NEPA, Congress' intent in establishing a national
environmental policy could be defeated on a large scale. Moreover, if
this type of activity were condoned, it would inevitably spread to
other areas of federal regulation, to be invoked whenever categorical
immunity would provide a convenient shelter from a potentially burdensome federal statutory provision.
The court in Calvert Cliffs was emphatic in pointing out that
"considerations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost"
should not be allowed to defeat the NEPA provisions. 2 ' To condone
manipulative agency rulemaking aimed at circumventing congressional mandates could issue an open invitation to already
overburdened agencies, which might, in the long run, defeat not only
NEPA but many other statutes as well.
If NEPA has the effect of increasing the administrative workload
or making it inconvenient for agencies to proceed with their projects,
this is a price which the American people have asserted, through
their elected officials, that they are willing to pay. NEPA was enacted in response to many years of public demand for environmental
legislation. 27 The taxpayers apparently felt that the importance of
maintaining the environment for future generations was well worth
the cost that would be required. Such a decision should not be subject to overriding agency ,impulses. Until Congress instructs other125. Obviously, our system is one in which lawmaking roles are often blurred.
Courts make law, sometimes with detail similar to legislative acts; rulemaking agencies
make law - indeed, one has only to look at the Code of Federal Regulations to realize
that agency-made law is much more voluminous than Congress-made law. Yet, an executive administrative agency that promulgates regulations contrary to the mandate given it
by Congress acts ultra vires, and unconstitutionally crosses the somewhat fuzzy line separating government branches.

126. Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115.
127.

See supra note 7.
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wise, the EPA should be required to proceed according to the standards dictated by the voters.
CONCLUSION

NEPA requires preparation of an EIS to determine the environmental impact of all proposed government actions which could have
a significant effect on the environment." 8 The EPA has promulgated
regulations categorically exempting RCRA permits from NEPA requirements.12 9 Since RCRA does not authorize the EPA to create
such exemptions, the agency has exceeded the scope of its administrative authority. 130 Such activity violates constitutional principles
and, from a public policy standpoint, sets an undesirable precedent
for other administrative agencies.
The environmental consequences that will inevitably result from
the RCRA exemption provisions are a high price to pay for the administrative convenience the EPA seeks in avoiding preparation of
environmental impact statements. Simplifying the administrative
tasks of the EPA does not justify compromising the environment in
contravention of Congress' desires. When weighed against the longterm environmental effects certain to result from RCRA immunity
from the NEPA provisions, the relatively small burden that would be
involved in continuing to evaluate EIS applicability on a careful
case-by-case basis is warranted.
Congress should address this issue and clearly define the requirements of the RCRA permit process. If categorical exemptions are
intended they should be codified as they are in the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act. If the political climate of the country favors
more lenient enforcement of environmental protection statutes, Congress may determine this and act on it. Otherwise the EPA regulations categorically exempting RCRA permits from NEPA requirements should be abrogated.
KRISTINA HAUENSTEIN

128. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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